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We describe an outbreak of Burkholderia stabilis asso-
ciated with contaminated washing gloves, a commer-
cially available Class I medical device. Triggered by an 
increase in Burkholderia cepacia complex (BCC) bacte-
remias and the detection of BCC in unopened packages 
of washing gloves, an ad hoc national outbreak com-
mittee comprising representatives of a public health 
organisation, a regulatory agency, and an expert 
association convened and commissioned an outbreak 
investigation. The investigation included retrospective 
case finding across Switzerland and whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) of isolates from cases and gloves. 
The investigation revealed that BCC were detected in 
clinical samples of 46 cases aged 17 to 91 years (33% 
females) from nine institutions between May 2015 and 
August 2016. Twenty-two isolates from case patients 
and 16 from washing gloves underwent WGS. All avail-
able outbreak isolates clustered within a span of < 19 
differing alleles, while 13 unrelated clinical isolates 
differed by > 1,500 alleles. This BCC outbreak was rap-
idly identified, communicated, investigated and halted 
by an ad hoc collaboration of multiple stakeholders. 
WGS served as useful tool for confirming the source 
of the outbreak. This outbreak also highlights cur-
rent regulatory limitations regarding Class I medical 
devices and the usefulness of a nationally coordinated 
outbreak response.
Introduction 
Medical devices are defined as any instrument, appa-
ratus, appliance, material or other article to be used on 
human beings for diagnosis, prevention, monitoring or 
alleviation of disease. In Europe, medical devices are 
classified by the potential risk they pose to the health 
of patients, users or third parties [1,2]. The underly-
ing rationale for this risk-based system is to direct the 
most rigorous conformity assessment procedures to 
those products conferring the greatest risk [1,2]. Class 
I medical devices, e.g. non-sterile products that only 
come into contact with intact skin [1], represent the 
lowest risk category and conformity assessment is left 
to the responsibility of the manufacturer [3]. If a Class 
I device conforms with the Medical Devices Directive 
it can then be placed on the market in the entire 
European Economic Area, Turkey and Switzerland [3,4]. 
Only a few outbreaks have been traced to Class I medi-
cal devices contaminated at the site of their production 
[5,6].
Bacteria belonging to the Burkholderia cepacia complex 
(BCC) are ubiquitous in the environment and survive 
with minimal nutritional requirements. These bacteria 
may cause difficult-to-treat lung infections, for 
example, in cystic fibrosis patients [7], and outbreaks 
in the hospital setting [8,9] are often linked to con-
taminated products used in patient care. Specifically, 
reports have been published on outbreaks caused by 
medical devices [10], ultrasound gel [11], environmental 
contamination [12,13], inhaled products [14-16], paren-
teral solutions [17-21], disinfectants [22-24], lubricants 
for urinary catheterization [25], mouthwash [26-30], 
2 www.eurosurveillance.org
laxatives [31], products for external use such as mois-
turizing cream [32,33] and washcloths [6,34].
Here, we present data on an outbreak with B. stabilis, 
a member of the BCC and associated with contami-
nated washing gloves, a Class I medical device. These 
washing gloves are commercially available packaged 
products that are usually acquired by healthcare insti-
tutions and intended for whole body washing of bedrid-
den patients.
We also describe the response to the outbreak by an 
interdisciplinary group of stakeholders, including a 
public health organisation, a regulatory agency, an 
expert association and a professional society. Finally, 
we discuss regulatory and administrative issues lim-
iting efficient and thorough national or even inter-
national investigation of an outbreak with a Class I 
medical device.
The event
The initial cluster of nosocomial BCC infections was 
detected in April and May 2016 in a 270-bed regional 
hospital in the canton of Bern, Switzerland. The index 
patient was an adult in their 70s with a central venous 
catheter-associated bloodstream infection due to BCC, 
as diagnosed on 5 April 2016 when she was in the 
intensive care unit (ICU). The striking feature of this 
first case was the occurrence of bacteraemia only two 
days after admission to the hospital and only 2 days 
after placement of a central venous catheter. A second 
case of bloodstream infection with BCC occurred two 
weeks later in an adult in their 60s with a prolonged 
stay in the same ICU. These two cases triggered a 
local outbreak investigation that could not identify the 
source of the infection. The outbreak continued within 
the same ICU, with third and fourth bacteraemia cases 
until 11 May 2016.
On 26 April 2016 a first sampling assessed ultra-
sound gel and the hospital environment (computer 
Figure 1
Diagnosis of cases with Burkholderia cepacia complex associated with contaminated Sinaqua Dermal Gloves by date of 
detection and type of infection or colonisation, Switzerland, May 2015–October 2016 (n = 46 outbreak cases and 1 ‘post-
outbreak’ casea)
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keyboards, resuscitation car, patient monitors, doors 
of patient rooms) but all remained negative. On 13 
May 2016, a second negative sampling included local 
anaesthesia medication and chlorhexidine alcohol 
used for preparation of central vein access. Eventually, 
on 27 May 2016, BCC were discovered in a package of 
disinfectant-free washing gloves (Sinaqua, Welcare, 
Italy). These gloves come in different formats (gloves or 
wipes), and are pre-moisturised. They may also contain 
chlorhexidine 2%. The gloves implicated here are dis-
infectant free but contain benzalkonium chloride 0.1% 
as a preservative agent. On 27 May 2016, the Swiss 
Figure 2
Minimal spanning tree based on cgMLST allelic differences of outbreak and unrelated Burkholderia strains from patients 
and gloves, Switzerland, March 2016–October 2016
cgMLST: core genome multilocus sequence typing.
Isolates are shown as circles connected to the most related isolates, with numbers of allelic differences depicted along the connecting 
lines (not to scale). Green circles: isolates from eleven patients that were colonised; red circles: isolates derived from seven patients with 
bloodstream infections; blue circles: isolates from three patients with non-bloodstream infections; light grey circles: isolates from washing 
gloves (A-P); dark grey circles: unrelated isolates (O1-O13; ATCC27515 BAA-67). The cluster of outbreak-associated isolates is shown in the box 
in the lower right. Isolates A and B; E and F; L, M, N, and O, which are grouped by dotted lines, are each from a single, separate package of 
washing gloves. The core genome multilocus sequence typing (cgMLST) multiple spanning tree was generated in Ridom SeqSphere+ based on 
7,521 coding sequences.
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Agency for Therapeutic Products (Swissmedic) and the 
Swiss distributor of the washing gloves GD Medical 
(Freienbach, Switzerland) were informed of these find-
ings. Swissmedic acted within the legal framework 
and did not impose an immediate sales stop. Shortly 
thereafter, in June 2016, Bern University Hospital iden-
tified a series of patients in whom BCC were detected. 
Washing glove contamination with BCC, which had 
been identified as the possible source for infections 
in the regional hospital, was subsequently also found 
in Bern on 24 June 2016 following four cases with the 
same pathogen and exposure to the same gloves from 
the same manufacturer. On 27 June 2016, Swissmedic 
ordered an immediate sales stop of the product.
Methods 
Organisation of the national outbreak 
investigation
The Swiss Centre for Antibiotic resistance (Anresis) 
[35] was contacted on 5 July 2016 and commissioned 
to search their database for non-duplicate  B. cepa-
cia isolates for the time period from January 2015 to June 
2016. Anresis has previously been described in detail 
[36]. In brief, Anresis prospectively collects routine 
antibiotic resistance data from 20 clinical microbiol-
ogy laboratories evenly distributed across Switzerland, 
representing at least 70% of annual hospitalisation 
days in Switzerland. Most of the laboratories gather 
data from multiple hospitals, ranging from primary-
care to tertiary-care institutions. Anresis collects data 
both from inpatients and outpatients. Unpaired t-tests 
were used to compare monthly numbers of new cases 
of B. cepacia isolates between 2015 and 2016.
On 7 July 2016 as a result of the confirmation that 
the gloves were involved, a meeting between repre-
sentatives of Swissmedic, the Federal Office of Public 
Health (FOPH) and Swissnoso (the Swiss National 
Center for Infection Prevention) was held. The infec-
tion control unit of Bern University Hospital was man-
dated to conduct the national outbreak investigation. 
Table
Patient characteristics, treatment and outcome data, and evidence of association with outbreak strain of Burkholderia 
stabilis, Switzerland, May 2015–August 2016 (n = 46)
Characteristic
All Cases 
(n = 46)
Bloodstream infections 
(n = 14)
Non-bloodstream 
infectionsa (n = 8) Colonisation (n = 24)
n or (median) n or (median) n or (median) n or (median)
Age, years (67) (71) (69) (60)
Female sex 15 4 4 7
Unit where contact with Sinaqua occurred 46 14 8 24
ICU 23 7 6 10
Non-ICU medicine 9 3 0 6
Non-ICU surgery 10 4 2 4
Outpatient 4 0 0 4
Clinical outcomeb 46 14 8 24
No clinical impact 23 2 0 21
Resolution after antimicrobial treatment 14 5 6 3
Prolonged hospitalisation 7 6 1 0
ICU admission 1 1 0 0
Death 1 0 1 0
Antimicrobial treatment 26 12 7 7
Broad-spectrum beta-lactam or third/
fourth generation cephalosporin 12 4 3 5
Carbapenem 15 6 6 3
Trimethoprim/Sulfamethoxazol 9 8 1 0
Other 2 1 1 0
> 1 therapeutic agent 13 6 4 3
Case isolates available for whole genome 
sequencingc 21 7 3 11
Isolate belongs to the outbreak cluster 21 7 3 11
ICU: intensive care unit.
a Non-bloodstream infections included five respiratory tract infections, one wound infection, one urinary tract infection and one case of 
peritonitis.
b Only one clinical outcome (worst) per case reported on.
c Does not include the ‘post-outbreak’ case that also underwent whole genome sequencing.
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Shortly thereafter on 18 July 2017, the Swiss Society for 
Infectious Diseases (SSI) sent an alert to all members 
concerning the contaminated product. Genotyping and 
sequencing of the isolates was assigned to the Division 
of Clinical Microbiology at the University Hospital 
Basel.
Epidemiologic investigation
Healthcare institutions in Switzerland that ordered any 
Sinaqua products were identified via a list provided by 
the Swiss distributor. A case report form and a product 
report form (see Supplementary Materials [37]) were 
sent by email on 22 July 2016 to the identified institu-
tions. The email was sent to the following recipients, 
in descending order, according to their availability in 
the institutions: hospital epidemiologist or director of 
infection prevention, chief of the infectious diseases 
division, or chief of internal medicine. A reminder email 
containing preliminary results was sent out on 29 
August 2016.
Case definition, patient and product reporting forms
A case was defined as a patient with a BCC isolate from 
a clinical specimen obtained since 1 January 2015, and 
likely clinical contact with Sinaqua Dermal Glove. Only 
the first non-duplicate isolate was considered. The 
case report form collected data on patient characteris-
tics, sampling method, storage of clinical BCC isolates 
for further analyses, product testing for contamination 
and the corresponding results, details regarding indi-
vidual patient contact with Sinaqua Dermal Glove, and 
patient outcomes. The product report form collected 
data on different Sinaqua products used within the 
healthcare institutions, the departments where these 
were used, microbiological tests on the products and 
the corresponding results, the date the institution 
became aware of the washing glove contamination, 
and the delay until complete withdrawal of the wash-
ing glove product.
International alert
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) was informed about the outbreak 
on 22 September 2016. An urgent inquiry related to 
this Burkholderia outbreak was posted on the Epidemic 
Intelligence Information System for antimicrobial 
resistance and healthcare-associated infections 
(EPIS AMR-HAI), a platform where nominated public 
health experts across the EU can exchange technical 
information.
Microbiological investigation and whole 
genome sequencing
Evaluation of Sinaqua products (washing glove, wipes, 
shampoo caps) was performed in several Swiss micro-
biological laboratories capable of processing environ-
mental samples. If available, data on the product, the 
lot number, information on whether a package was 
sealed or had been opened before, and culture results 
were collected. This data was in addition to what we 
received via the questionnaire. A descriptive analysis 
of the results was performed.
DNA extracted from selected strains (22 clinical iso-
lates, 16 glove isolates and 13 unrelated clinical isolates, 
see Supplementary Materials [37]) underwent library 
preparation with the Nextera XT Library Preparation Kit 
(Illumina, San Diego, United States (US)) and sequenc-
ing with the MiSeq System (Illumina, San Diego, US), 
applying v3 2x300 bp chemistry. After read trimming, 
data was mapped against the reference genome of  B. 
cepacia  type strain ATCC 25416 (GenBank acces-
sion numbers NZ_CP012981–3) within CLC Genomics 
Workbench 9.5 (Qiagen, Venlo, the Netherlands) to 
determine genome coverage values [38]. Reads from 
isolate  E  provided a high coverage (> 100x) and were 
selected for de novo assembly within CLC Genomics 
Workbench. Automated annotation of predicted coding 
sequences was performed with Prokka [39]. The assem-
bled genome was used for species identification, with 
marker genes extracted and compared with earlier 
described species using BLASTn [40]. Molecular epide-
miological investigations were carried out using core 
genome multilocus sequence typing (cgMLST) analy-
sis with Ridom SeqSphere+ v3.2.1 (Ridom, Münster, 
Germany) [41]. Reads were quality trimmed to ≥ Q30 
and mapped against the reference genome of B. stabi-
lis  type strain ATCC27515 BAA-67 (GenBank accession 
numbers CP016442–4) [42]. A minimum coverage of 10x 
was needed for mapping. To obtain maximum resolu-
tion in resolving the outbreak, all annotated genes were 
included for allele based typing in Ridom SeqSphere+. 
Read data for all samples sequenced has been submit-
ted to the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA) under 
project numbers PRJEB18658 and PRJEB19203.
Results 
Anresis database search
The results of the Anresis query were available on 
5 July 2016. It yielded a non-significant (p = 0.43) 
increase in non-duplicate  B. cepacia  isolates per 
month in Switzerland from 5.3/month in 2015 (total 
n = 64) to 7.2/month in the first six months of 2016 
(total n = 39). The 39 isolates identified between 1 
January and 5 June 2016 were distributed across eight 
of all 26 Swiss cantons. Neither age nor gender of the 
cases was reported by the Anresis query. The number 
of B. cepacia  isolates from sterile sites increased non-
significantly (p = 0.38) from 0.8/month in 2015 (total 
n = 10) to 2.2/month in the first six months of 2016 
(total n = 13). Of note, there was a peak of six isolates 
from invasive cases in May 2016.
Epidemiologic investigation
According to the list from the Swiss distributor of the 
washing gloves, we identified and contacted 46 health-
care institutions that had purchased any Welcare 
products. Between 27 July and 21 November 2016 we 
received 19 responses from these institutions. Ten of 
19 reported no cases and/or not using this product 
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any more. From the remaining nine institutions, we 
received report forms for 50 cases of BCC recovered 
after January 2015. These nine institutions were scat-
tered across seven of 26 cantons and highly congruent 
with the cantons identified in the Anresis query, includ-
ing locations in the eastern, central, northern and 
western part of the country. They included three of the 
five Swiss academic hospitals, as well as six midsize to 
large regional hospitals with 200 to 900 beds.
Of note, all nine institutions with cases employed a 
physician trained in infectious diseases; in six of these 
nine institutions, the infectious diseases physician had 
also undergone training in infection control.
Each of these nine institutions reported between one 
and nine cases each. After excluding four cases where 
contact with Sinaqua Dermal Glove was unlikely, a total 
of 46 cases were further evaluated. Cases were strati-
fied according to the clinical diagnosis related to the 
recovered isolate. The epidemiologic curve of these 
cases, including mark-up of cases that underwent WGS, 
is shown in Figure 1. Patient characteristics, treatment 
and outcome data, stratified by the clinical diagnosis, 
and information as to whether the isolate belongs to 
the outbreak cluster defined by WGS are displayed 
in  Table. The outbreak strain was susceptible to most 
antimicrobial agents with BCC activity and we opted 
not to report resistance data.
We received completed product report forms from nine 
institutions, of which eight reported cases. All eight of 
the responders had been using Sinaqua dermal gloves 
in their ICUs. Other areas of use included the emer-
gency room, the pre-/post-operative care area, the 
wound care unit or general wards. Seven institutions 
had noted the dates when they were first informed of 
the washing glove contamination and when they with-
drew it. The dates of first notice ranged from 27 May 
to 8 July 2016. The median time until withdrawal was 
completed was 2 days (range: 1–10). We did not receive 
any reports on international cases through the ECDC’s 
EPIS AMR-HAI platform.
Microbiological investigation and whole 
genome sequencing
We received information on 31 Sinaqua product sam-
ples, from six different institutions and the Swiss 
distributor that had been evaluated for microbial con-
tamination in five different microbiology laboratories. 
Of the 22 tests concerning the Sinaqua Dermal Glove, 
18 tested positive for BCC. In four of the 18,  Serratia 
marcescens  was recovered in addition to BCC. The 
analysis included both packaged and opened products 
but information to make this distinction was often 
lacking. Also, one of three Sinaqua Dermal Wipes tested 
positive for BCC. An additional six reports concerned 
Sinaqua Shampoo Cap and Sinaqua Paediatrics; these 
products showed no contamination. The data including 
the lot numbers is summarised in the Supplementary 
Materials [37].
There were 22 of 46 isolates from patients meeting 
the case definition available for WGS (including one 
‘post-outbreak’ case because of incomplete with-
drawal of the washing gloves), as well as 16 isolates 
from washing gloves. The genome of outbreak iso-
late  E  (see Supplementary Materials [37]) was assem-
bled from WGS reads, resulting in a genome draft 
of 8’300’288 bp across 129 contigs. Marker genes 
for phylogenetic identification of the species were 
extracted from the automated assembly and com-
pared against the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information (NCBI) database [43]. The outbreak strain 
was identified as  B. stabilis, best matching  B. sta-
bilis  ATCC BAA-67 according to  recA  (1,065/1,071 
identical bp; 99.4%),  rpoB  (4,090/4,107 bp; 99.6%) 
and gyrA  (2,543/2,556 bp; 99.5%). Identification using 
the 16S rRNA gene was less discriminatory, with many 
species within the BCC sharing over 99% identity, and 
both  B. stabilis  ATCC BAA-67 and  B.  pyrrocinia  strain 
DSM 10685 providing best matches (1,520/1,521 bp; 
99.9%). Based on 7,521 predicted coding sequences, 
cgMLST analysis was performed. Outbreak strains clus-
tered together and differed from each other by a maxi-
mum of 18 alleles within the 7,521 coding sequences 
(Figure 2). The fourteen unrelated Burkholderia strains 
(including the ATC25416 reference strain) sequenced as 
a part of this project were separated by more than 1,500 
alleles from outbreak-associated isolates, as was the B. 
stabilis  reference strain ATCC BAA-67. No clustering 
of strains according to infection or colonisation was 
observed (Figure 2). 
Discussion
We present data on a nationwide outbreak of B. stabi-
lis  associated with contaminated washing gloves that 
led to the identification of 46 patients fulfilling the case 
definition. Among these 46 cases, half were classified 
as colonisation, while the other half had either a 
bloodstream or any other infection. The distribution 
of clinical diagnoses is in line with similar BCC-related 
outbreaks that were due to contaminated washcloths 
[6,34]. This association and the widespread availability 
of these gloves in ICUs could indicate a possible appli-
cation of the washing glove in central venous catheter 
care. This, in turn, may have resulted in BCC catheter-
related bloodstream infections. Similar to other out-
breaks, many items in the patient environment were 
tested before identifying the contaminated gloves as 
source of the outbreak (data not shown).
Earlier studies in clinical microbiological diagnostics 
have shown that the sequence of the 16S rRNA gene 
is insufficient to define species within the BCC [44,45]. 
The molecular epidemiological investigation using 
cgMLST demonstrated limited genomic diversity (up 
to 18 allelic differences) among the outbreak isolates. 
This result points to a highly clonal source, which was 
most likely the manufacturing site. The isolates from 
patients and washing gloves were interspersed in the 
minimal spanning tree, indicating that this diversity 
was already present at the source of the contamination 
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and did not develop during each of the 46 individual 
manifestations. Interestingly, isolates obtained from 
a single glove package showed similar variability (2 
to 8 allelic differences) as observed between the iso-
lates of different patients. Our observations thus 
argue for direct colonisation of the patients with the 
strains contaminating the washing gloves, and reflect 
the clonal pool of  B. stabilis  within the contaminated 
glove packages. In line with this finding, we did not 
identify any clade among the isolates that correlated 
with colonisation, bloodstream infections or non-
bloodstream infection.
This national outbreak highlighted that no single entity 
in Switzerland was yet entrusted with coordinating 
such a complex outbreak response. It was only because 
of the study team noticing detections scattered across 
multiple cantons that a nationwide outbreak investiga-
tion was deemed necessary. Anresis provided an initial 
search and delineated the trend of increasing B. cepa-
cia detections. This was the first time that the Anresis 
database was used as a supporting tool during an out-
break investigation. The results from the Anresis query 
demonstrated the importance of a common microbiol-
ogy laboratory database readily available for access. 
Our report further suggests that enhancing the Anresis 
database by adding automated pattern recognition 
would be an asset to future outbreak investigations.
The ad hoc collaboration between the FOPH, 
Swissmedic and Swissnoso enabled a swift outbreak 
investigation. Eventually, a specific infection control 
unit at Bern University Hospital and a single clinical 
microbiology laboratory at Basel University Hospital 
were mandated, although not financially compensated, 
to conduct this investigation. A framework and reim-
bursement mechanism would have further streamlined 
the investigation and as a direct consequence of this 
outbreak, the FOPH mandated and funded Swissnoso 
to create and maintain a national outbreak investiga-
tion entity.
Swissmedic published a product recall alert on 27 June 
2016 and the Swiss distributor sent a letter to custom-
ers informing them that all products should be returned 
to them pending further investigation. The manufactur-
ing company (located in Italy) declared on 25 August 
2016 that they had detected the source of contamina-
tion in a tube leading to the assembly line, but this was 
not confirmed by an independent regulatory body and 
no bacterial isolates from the factory site were avail-
able for comparison. Nevertheless, the high genomic 
relatedness encountered in isolates from both gloves 
and patients points to the source being most likely the 
production line. With the recall alert from Swissmedic, 
the letter from the gloves’ Swiss distributor and a 
switch to alternative washing gloves, the outbreak 
was rapidly terminated in August 2016; only one addi-
tional case occurred in October 2016 due to incomplete 
withdrawal of the contaminated product. A follow-up 
Anresis query on 20 February 2017 documented the 
decrease in BCC bacteremias to baseline levels after 
July 2016 and as of November 2017, no additional cases 
have been reported. We were unable to confirm any 
cases by WGS that had occurred before March 2016, 
and the Anresis query did not yield elevated BCC bacte-
raemia rates before March 2016. We therefore felt that 
looking back to January 2015 was sufficient. Also, the 
course of the epicurve makes earlier cases unlikely. 
Nevertheless, we cannot formally exclude cases that 
may have occurred before January 2015.
Interactions between Swissmedic and its European 
counterparts occurred according to the regulatory 
framework [2,46]. Although Swissmedic announced 
the product withdrawal on their website and informed 
the EU’s national competent authorities for medical 
devices, these public withdrawal alerts may have been 
poorly visible to the end consumer. For this reason, 
we directly informed the ECDC on 22 September 2016, 
which, in response, posted an urgent inquiry on EPIS 
AMR-HAI. Although no cases were reported to the ECDC 
to date, we cannot exclude the possibility of additional 
cases linked to this product having occurred in other 
countries.
There were several limitations to this study. First, 
not all institutions identified via the distributor’s 
list responded to the inquiry. We noted that the nine 
responding institutions were rather large hospitals 
with a dedicated infectious diseases service. Second, 
contact with the washing glove was self-reported and 
therefore not necessarily accurate. Furthermore, not 
all isolates were genotyped, especially not those from 
non-sterile sites, and final proof that they all belong to 
the outbreak is thus lacking. The extent of the outbreak 
may also have been underestimated as gloves could 
have been used in other institutions or in the care of 
patients where no microbiological sampling was per-
formed. For the outbreak investigation, we did not 
track infections due to S. marcescens, which were spo-
radically found in the contaminated washing gloves. 
Finally, because the microbiological evaluation of the 
washing gloves was sometimes performed on gloves 
from packages that were already opened or from pack-
ages where the status was not available, secondary 
contamination of the gloves could have been possi-
ble. However, the WGS results argue against multiple 
sources of contamination.
According to the regulatory framework in Switzerland 
and the EU, only the manufacturing company itself is 
responsible for taking internal corrective measures 
for medical Class I devices in response to notifica-
tions [2,3,47]. Current legislation does not require a 
control mechanism of the corrections by an independ-
ent regulatory body [2,3,47]. In the authors’ opinion, 
the processes and legal frameworks for recalling and 
re-introducing contaminated medical Class I devices 
should be reviewed in order to further ensure patient 
safety.
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In conclusion, the outbreak was rapidly identified, 
investigated, communicated and terminated because 
of an ad hoc, interdisciplinary collaboration between 
partners at different levels. WGS was a helpful method 
to describe clonality of the outbreak. For the future, 
having a national outbreak investigation commit-
tee with different stakeholders promises to allow for 
a rapid outbreak response and independent quality 
control regulations for contaminated medical devices 
should be established.
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